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Abstract 
  
  
ARE LEGISLATION AND RULES A PROBLEM IN LAW? 
Thoughts on the Work of Joseph Vining 
  
  
Patrick McKinley Brennan 
  
  
  
            Written for a conference at Villanova Law School held to celebrate and explore 
the work of Joseph Vining over forty years, this paper considers the adequacy of Vining’s 
phenomenology of law.  Specifically, it inquires into the accuracy of Vining’s startling 
claims that “legislation is a problem in law, not central to law” and “rules are nowhere to 
be found” in law.  The argument of the paper is that when -- but only when -- law is 
understood to be an ordinance of reason in the mind of him or them who have care of the 
community, for the common good, and promulgated, is legislation not a problem in law.  
Such an ordinance is not a problem, but in fact a very good thing, exactly because by it 
the ruling authority leads the people to their common good.  The practical problem comes 
in framing ordinances that in fact live up to this definition, and for this regnative 
prudence is required.  But the formation of such prudence, the paper also argues, is not 
itself a lawless enterprise.  In the natural law tradition, the human project of making law 
is itself understood to be ruled by higher law.  The paper concludes by asking whether 
Vining’s account of law is ultimately lawless.  Vining, like Judge Noonan, understands 
the making of law to be, at its best, a response to persons.  The paper contends that the 
all-important question, much mooted in modernity and not directly faced by Vining, is 
whether persons are themselves naturally under law, such that they can proceed to make 
more law on the basis of it.  It is not clear how lawless persons can proceed to make law 
that is anything but arbitrary, yet it is clear that Vining denies that the arbitrary is law.        
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ARE LEGISLATION AND RULES A PROBLEM IN LAW? 
Thoughts on the Work of Joseph Vining 
 
 
Patrick McKinley Brennan1 
 
 
“Law has not accepted the spirit of the age that (in Keats’s words) 
would clip an Angel’s wings and empty the haunted air.” 
 
-Joseph Vining2 
 
 
I.   Discovering (the ability to make) law 
 
Our lives are laced with law from beginning to end.  It starts with who gets to be 
born; ranges over what we foods we can eat, what drugs we can take along the way, the 
days and hours we can imbibe or purchase Chartreuse; and rounds out its tour of duty 
with where one’s cremated remains can be scattered when the food, the drugs, and the 
secret of that green elixir of 130 Alpine herbs no longer matter.  Law’s place in our 
society is vast by any historical comparison.  Theologian Oliver O’Donovan comments 
sardonically that today, “[a]n incessant stream of lawmaking is the fundamental proof of 
political viability.”3  Joseph Vining takes a different tack:  “Law will not be 
acknowledged soon by the articulate . . . .  But . . .the legal form of thought is not about to 
die from disuse.  And if law itself should begin to disappear, then, like air, its absence 
might press its necessity into consciousness.”4      
Surrounded as we are by law on all sides, we must beware the normative power of 
the actual.  It was not always so.  Nor need it be so.  To be a language-using animal is 
natural to us, but hardly necessary or automatic; we can instead gawk.  Likewise, to make 
law is natural to us, but it is not a certainty of physics that we will make law to live by; 
chaos is possible, at least for a season or two.  In my favorite of his four books, From 
Newton’s Sleep, Vining asks, “Could some fall into what Blake envisioned two centuries 
ago as Newton’s Sleep?”  And he answers, “Legal thought is the daily exercise that not 
only allows us to sleep in peace, but keeps us from Newton’s Sleep.”5  
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Remarkably, and especially so from our perspective within a law-laden culture, 
the capacity to make law, though latent in human potential from the beginning, is itself a 
discovery.  As Friedrich Hayek famously remarked, “[t]he deliberate making of law, has 
justly been described as among all inventions of man the one fraught with the gravest 
consequences, more far-reaching in its effects even than fire and gun-powder.”6  
Expounding on this passage, Russell Hittinger notes that “[w]e can roughly mark the date 
when this new kind of gunpowder was invented.  The year was 1231.”7  The discovery 
was made by Frederick II, the Holy Roman Emperor and also the King of Sicily.  One 
can study the results in the Liber Augustalis, also known as the Constitutions of Melfi, 
promulgated on account of a perceived “greater need for justice.”8   
My current interest is the fallout from the (re-)discovery of that capacity 
beginning some half a millennium later, first by the English and then later by the 
Americans.  As readers of law reviews are amply aware, the law of England was long 
constituted primarily by the “common law.”  With the bulk of law thus said to be found 
or made (the difference need not detain us here) by judges on a case-by-case basis, 
legislation – statutes made from scratch by a legislature – remained for centuries the 
upstart exception in terms of the nature and sources of English law.  Until about the 
eighteenth century, a legislature’s deliberately making new law by voting to enact a bill 
was exceptional in the English legal system. 
 As time went along, minds continued to differ, moreover, on the question of 
whether legislation was to be favored and increased, or disfavored and cabined.  Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679) early on had important things to say on behalf of making law 
through legislation, but it took another century until Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) 
undertook to advocate systematically for proliferating legislation in a fully rationalized 
codification.9 
Not more than a century after Bentham began writing, Sir John Robert Seeley 
reported, in 1885, that Englishmen by then lived in a “Legislation-state.”10  There was by 
then broad agreement, Seeley went on to observe, “that there is a vast amount to be done, 
that we have more work before us than can possibly be undertaken,” and that, as a result, 
“governments ought to be continually busy in passing important laws.”  All of this, 
Seeley concluded, was exceptional:  “Historically, this is as unlike as possible to the 
doctrine of other periods.  The state in other times . . . was not supposed to be concerned 
with legislation.”11  Seeley must have been confining himself to describing the English 
situation, because Frederick, to recur to the example alluded to above, had by no means 
hesitated to legislate for his Sicilian subjects in 1231.  Nor was Frederick alone in 
legislating on the Continent.  Napoleon comes to mind.   
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Returning our attention closer to home, although Seeley purported not to be 
passing judgment, his objection is palpable.  Others followed suit.  Writing the better part 
of another century later, Grant Gilmore remarked an “orgy of statute making”12 that 
began in the United States in the 1930s, and one would not rush to find in the 
phraseology of the sober Gilmore an approval of the orgiastic.  Writing in 1982, then-
Dean (now-Judge) Guido Calabresi lamented that Americans were “choking on 
statutes.”13  “All agree,” Calabresi went on to observe, “that modern American law is 
dominated by statutes.”14  Justice Antonin Scalia summed up the situation, without here 
passing judgment for or against, when he stated, in 1997: “[w]e live in an age of 
legislation, and most new law is statutory law.”15 
  Justice Scalia has, however, made abundantly clear that this state of affairs, the 
predominance of enacted law, is very much to his liking.  For one thing, it is allegedly 
democratic, in the sense that the laws are made by the people’s representatives, not by 
judges.16  For another, and this is by far the more important point for present purposes, it 
is an ontologically abstemious enterprise, or at least Justice Scalia insists it can – and 
should -- be.  “[A] system of enacted law, properly applied,”17 avoids, according to 
Justice Scalia, appeal to anything ontologically thick.  This is because, if Scalia is to be 
believed, a system of enacted law “properly applied” involves appeal to nothing more 
than the ordinary public meaning of statutes  This, in a nutshell, is the theory of legal 
interpretation called “textualism” that Justice Scalia has been promoting for several 
decades:  “What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the 
original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”18  I assume the 
reader is familiar with textualism as a possible interpretive strategy, but the reader may 
not have adverted to the fact that one of its boasts, according to Justice Scalia, is that it 
involves nothing ontologically dense, only texts and their “‘objectified’ intent.”19  The 
context for Scalia’s denying that law requires anything ontologically dense was Steven 
Smith’s argument to the contrary, an argument he advanced with reliance on the insights 
of Joseph Vining.20 
Textualism is only one among many available interpretive approaches to 
legislation, needless to say, but here it can function in the mode of synechdoche as we 
inquire into the place of legislation in law.  Textualism provides the limit case of a 
general jurisprudential approach to enacted law that would render a statute to be the law 
ex proprio vigore.   We can ask, then, whether, on occasions when statutes are 
concededly the starting points of a particular legal analysis, discovering and giving effect 
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   GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) 
13
   GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) 
14
   Id. at 183 n.1. 
15
   ANTONIN SCALIA, COMMON-LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES 
FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, IN A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 13 
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to the “‘objectified’ intent” of pieces of enacted law is in fact all there is to the legal 
enterprise?  We can ask, further, whether statutes are ever law in their own right?   
Hardly, or so I shall argue here, partly on the basis of Justice Scalia’s own 
performance.  One manifestation of that something more, the one that will concern me 
here, appears in (as I shall call it) the passage from legislation to law.  Though it may 
come as a surprise to those not trained in law, legal theorists and others, including 
textualist judges, are not in agreement that legislation is per se law.  Some theorists, 
including the distinguished political philosopher and jurist Jeremy Waldron, affirm that 
legislation is law. 21  Others, such as John Chipman Gray, deny the claim:  “[L]egislative 
acts, statutes, are to be dealt with as sources of Law, and not as part of the Law itself . . . 
.”
22
 
Joseph Vining, whose work is my principal interest in this paper, makes a slightly 
different, iconoclastic, and potentially decisive, claim:  “[L]egislation is a problem in law, 
not central to law.”23  We undeniably live in a legislation state, yet legislation is, at least 
according to Vining, a problem in law, not central to it. 
Vining’s claim, too, is disputed, as by Waldron.  Not only does Waldron maintain 
that legislation is law; exasperated by the view according to which statute law is “a low-
bred parvenu, all surface and no depth, all power and no heritage, as arbitrary in its 
provenance as the temporary coalescence of a parliamentary or congressional majority,”24 
Waldron has recently put in three cheers for statutes in a book bearing the title The 
Dignity of Legislation.  Waldron’s stated goal in the book was “to try to recover and 
highlight ways of thinking about legislation that present it as a dignified mode of 
governance and a respectable source of law.”25  In marshalling his case, Waldron brings 
to bear the arguments of Aristotle, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, among others.  As 
we shall see, Aquinas, whom Waldron does not enlist, is another, different sort of ally.            
Who is right -- the champions of legislation, or legislation’s critics?  Those who 
affirm that legislation is law, or those who deny it?  Or, for a third possibility, those who 
recognize the ways in which legislation, as commonly understood, both is and is not a 
problem in law?  The last group, I submit, for reasons that I shall develop in the pages 
ahead.  But this much can be said now.  Legislation is something we make in abundance, 
something we are existentially free not to make, and something we perhaps should make, 
and for moral reasons that are also properly legal reasons -- but should make only, I 
shall argue, on condition that we not think that what gets enacted is itself necessarily per 
se the law.  A consideration of the ways in which legislation in fact functions in the 
actual process of saying what the law is will begin to shed light our deeper ontological 
commitments about what law is, and, correlatively, about who we are and who we 
believe we ought to become.  It will illuminate what Vining likes to call, in a felicitous 
phrase, “the legal mind,”26 though perhaps in ways that are even more law-governed than 
Vining, for his part, believes free minds can be. 
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II.  Legislation in Law 
 
 In inquiring into how legislation in fact functions in the process of making law, 
we will need an example.  We can do no better than the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), a statutory “second-level constitution”27 (as Joseph Vining has described it), 
which, as Justice Robert Jackson explained in the first Supreme Court opinion that 
construed the APA, “settles long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a 
formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.”28   Justice 
Jackson even warned ominously of “a disservice to our form of government and to the 
administrative process itself” if the courts were to disregard “the terms of the Act.”  
Enacted by a unanimous Congress in 1946 (and later amended in terms that are not here 
relevant), the APA has remained “on the books” ever since, providing, as practicing 
lawyers know all too well, the default provisions setting out the procedures of operation 
for all of the dozens and dozens of federal administrative agencies, from the Social 
Security Administration to National Labor Relations Board.  The Act’s “default” 
character is the result of its remaining possible for the Congress to provide, as it 
frequently does for particular agencies, provisions different from those set out in the 
APA.  Congress legislated in the APA itself, however, that “[s]ubsequent statute may not 
be held to supersede or modify [it] . . . except to the extent that it does so expressly.”29 
Like the Constitution, then, which specifies the terms of its own amendment, the APA 
limits the terms of its modification or supersession.   
 Pivotal to the APA’s operation is its distinction between agency “rule making,” 
which is like what legislatures do, and agency “adjudication,” which is like what courts 
do.  A different battery of procedures and process applies to rule making than to 
adjudication.  An agency must know, therefore, whether what it is about to do is a rule 
making or an adjudication, and for this determination the APA provides definitions.    
According to the APA’s definitional section, adjudication is the procedure for producing 
an “order,” and “rule making” is the procedure for producing a rule.  Having thus defined 
these activities of government by reference to their products, the APA in effect provides 
(with an exception that is not here material) that an “order” is every agency output that is 
not a “rule.”  The APA’s definition of what a rule is, therefore, is all together central to 
the operation of this entire “second-level” constitution, and here is what the text of the 
APA, Section 551(4), says (in relevant part):  “‘rule’ means the whole or a part of an 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . .”   
A prominent scholar has called this definition the APA’s “most blatantly 
defective provision.”30  Why?  As then-Professor Scalia explained: 
 
Since every statement is of either general or particular applicability, and 
since everything an agency does is “designed to implement, interpret, or 
                                                 
27
   Joseph Vining, Administrative Agencies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 36, 37 
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prescribe law or policy, etc.,” the only limiting (that is to say, defining) 
part of the definition [of a rule] is “agency statement . . .  of future effect.”  
That is of course absurd .  It means, for example, that an EPA directive 
that a particular company must, in order to comply with existing law and 
regulations, install particular emission-control equipment at a particular 
factory is a rule rather than an order; that the proceeding looking to its 
issuance is rulemaking rather than adjudication . . . .  Such an analysis 
produces a categorization which is . . . contrary to the common 
understanding of what constitutes rulemaking . . . . 31 
 
What, then, is a judge to do when called upon to determine whether an agency output is a 
rule?  Scalia’s answer:  “[I]t is generally acknowledged that the only responsible judicial 
attitude toward this central APA definition is one of benign disregard.”32  In other words, 
disregard the portion of the statute that says “or particular” applicability.  Why?  Because 
there is broad agreement that rules are comparatively general, not “particular,” and this 
agreement prevails over the text of the statute in the process of deciding the law on point.  
Why?  Because the alternative is “absurd.”   
But what, then, of the dignity of this piece of legislation, indeed, this foundational 
component of the “second-level constitution” that is to be disregarded, ignored, 
overlooked, marginalized, denied effect?   Lest there be any question of softening or 
perhaps escaping this stark and startling result, there can be no serious doubt that it is 
exactly the original meaning of 551(4) that the “responsible judicial attitude” is said, by 
Scalia and those for whom he speaks, to have to reject,33 even though it was enacted, as 
mentioned above, by a unanimous Congress, and one can even make considerable 
progress in speculating why that Congress included “or particular” in the definition.34  
When it comes to the APA, then-Professor Scalia was even willing to sketch “an entire 
hierarchy of technical justifications for departure from the original text.”35  The first 
mentioned is “the common-law power of the courts to supplement the APA, [a] 
justification [that] is rarely phrased so baldly by the courts . . . .”36     
 This, then, is Exhibit A for Vining’s trenchant observation -- which begins to 
clarify the meaning of his earlier claim that legislation is a “problem in law” -- that 
“statutes . . . are only candidates for attention, not just in competition for enforcement 
resources, but in the very analysis of situations.  This is to be observed historically, from 
without.  It is also experienced by lawyers, from within”37 – including, as just noted, by 
the leading advocate of treating statutes according to their original public meaning.  Fine, 
but we also need to ask whether evidence like this, assuming we could amass enough of 
it, can establish Vining’s larger claim, to wit, that legislation is a problem in law – even 
                                                 
31
   Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. 
REV. 345, 383 (1979).   
32
   Id. 
33
   See U.S. Dep't of Justice, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
(1947). 
34
   The details are complicated, but the gist, in Gary Lawson’s speculation, is that it has to do with ensuring 
an exception to the otherwise absolute right of cross-examination for ratemakings. 
35
   Scalia, Vermont Yankee, supra note 31, at 389. 
36
   Id. 
37
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(or especially?) in a legal system dominated by legislation.  Before answering, we need 
first to follow another lead Vining lays out. 
 
   
III.  Rules in Law 
 
 Among the reasons I chose the particular example with which we have just been 
working is that the statute in question is a rule about rules, and rules, like legislation 
itself, enjoy an instructively contested place in legal analysis and jurisprudential 
discussion.  To pick just one example, in the most-discussed book in Anglo-American 
legal philosophy in the twentieth century, H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, first 
published in 1961, the central thesis advanced is that a “legal system” just is the union of 
rules of two kinds, viz., primary rules and secondary rules.  (Hart, of course, was 
opposing the Austinian view according to which law just is the command of the 
sovereign backed by the threat of punishment).  While Hart later conceded that he had 
overstated his case38, Justice Scalia has recently urged that we make the rule of law as 
much as possible a rule of rules.  Justice Scalia contends that “[o]nly by announcing rules 
d we hedge ourselves in. . . .  All I urge is that . . . . [totality of the circumstances tests 
and balancing modes of analysis] be avoided where possible; that the Rule of Law, the 
law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question allows.”39  As Scalia sees 
things, the alleged boast of a rule – as opposed to a “standard,” which is comparatively 
vague and open-textured – is that, first, it is comparatively precise and, second, it applies 
(or it does not) according to its own terms.   
Vining, however, resists both the descriptive claim (Hart’s) and the normative 
claim (Scalia’s).  As to the descriptive:   “The distance of The Concept of Law from the 
reality of law was noted by those of us who read it as law students then, when it was new 
and before it became a text central to academic discussion.”40  The distance or dissonance 
concerns the place of rules in the unidealized practice of law.  As to the normative, 
Vining does not mince words: “[t]here is no such thing as a rule that exists or even has 
force in the mind.”41  What Scalia wishes us asymptotically to increase, Vining claims 
does not so much as exist in law, let alone admit of multiplication like loaves and fishes.  
The denial that there exist rules in law is one of the deepest and most recurrent currents in 
Vining’s work spanning forty years.  
 But is not Vining’s assertion, that “rules” of law do not even exist in law, 
overstated or even implausible?  After all, in addition to Hart, other serious legal scholars 
have recently devoted substantial efforts to specifying and defending the place of rules in 
our own legal system.42  And even Judge John Noonan, whose pioneering work in 
Persons and Masks of the Law sounded a warning about how talk of rules is sometimes 
wrongly used by persons in law to obscure the persons the rules ought to be serving, not 
                                                 
38
   H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 255-63 (2d ed. 1994). 
39
   Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1180, 1187 (1989). 
40
   Vining, Resilience, supra note 26, at 169 n.14. 
41
   VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP, supra note 4, at 239. 
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   See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES (2001); FRED SCHAUER, 
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND 
IN LIFE (1991). 
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only admits the existence of rules in law, but commends them in unguarded terms:  
“Abandonment of the rules [of law] produces monsters.”43    
We shall return to Noonan’s complementary recommendation – to wit, not to 
neglect persons -- below.  Before that, however, we need to press Vining and ask what he 
could possibly mean by the puzzling and apparently extravagant claim that there do not 
“exist” rules in law.  There are several strands that need untangling here, in several 
stages. 
 
IV.  Two Kinds of Rules, Not One 
 
First, Vining notes, on the one hand, that “[l]awyers speak the language of rules, 
but when they engage in law and are observed to engage in law, their rules are nowhere 
to be found.”44  This is a variation on the contention that launched our inquiry in this 
direction in the first place:  “[t]here is no such thing as a rule that exists or even has force 
in the mind.”  Second, on the other hand, however, according to Vining: “Of course we 
do speak of legal rules and argue in the language of rules.  It is useful to do so, an 
important part of mutual persuasion, a way of offering not just a vague suggestion but a 
finished product for serious consideration” He continues:  “But practicing lawyers and 
working judges know in their bones that while text can be closely read, including texts 
setting out ‘a rule,’ ‘the rule’ cannot.”45   
Third, while on his own account “rules” are not to be found in law, Vining readily 
acknowledges that elsewhere in life, as in chess and all those other activities we call 
games, there do exist rules.46  A player must have them in mind if she is to play the game.  
Indeed, (skillfully) following the rules is all there is to playing games – because we, the 
makers of the games, have created them for just that purpose, as Vining observes.47     
Finally, we all acknowledge the existence of the rules of which social scientists 
and natural scientists tell us.  The ancients explained the cosmos in terms of various 
combinations of basic elements and, later, typically (though not universally), in terms 
hylomorphism and teleology.48  In the post-Newtonian period, however, we expect the 
world, both natural and social, to be explained in terms of rules.  Scientists give us rules, 
and these rules are statements of the regularity of the world around us and even of parts 
of ourselves and of experiences we have.  The etymological connection between rule and 
regularity derives from the Latin word regula, meaning rule.49  At least by the fifth 
                                                 
43
   JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE 
AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 18 (2002) 
44
   Joseph Vining, Theorists’ Belief A Comment on the Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 15, 23 (1996). 
45
   Joseph Vining, The Gift of Language (Proper Honoris Respectum: Mary Ann Glendon), 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1581, 1587 (1998). 
46
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century, the Latin language developed an adverbial form of the word, regulariter, which 
referred to recurrence.50  Rules of the sort scientists give us are reports of regularity.         
Vining’s denial that there are rules in law involves a multidimensional concern 
that law not be assimilated to – or colonized by -- the world as studied by the natural and 
social sciences.  Even Blackstone  -- no Legal Realist he -- was complicit in the 
conflation.51  One dimension of the problem Vining fingers is the thought or contention 
that what we benightedly think of as the free and perhaps sometimes arbitrary (in the 
sense of willful, as opposed to reasoned) practice of law is in fact no more than one 
extended manifestation of a cosmic causal chain.   
 
 
The notion of a rule, insofar as law is associated with rules, is part of what 
would link law to the tyranny of nature over us, link law to gravity when 
we would leap, to blindness when we would see, to addiction and decay – 
law’s essence residing in the imperative as such, its givenness.52 
 
On this view, our human practice of law, in other words, would amount to no more than 
the functioning of what can be captured in (what Vining calls) a “total theory” in which 
we turn out to be just so many parts.53  It is a fact of history that “Newton’s philosophical 
adversaries objected to the absence of meaning or purpose in a cosmos that had no higher 
end than remaining in motion,” but it is equally a fact of history that the Newtonian view 
took relentless hold on modernity.54  Vining discerns in law a limit to the Newtonian 
explanation:  “[L]aw stands in the way of science . . . .  [L]aw stands in the way of self-
destruction.”55   
In substantiating these claims, Vining does not simply deny the claim that all is 
process, nor does he oppose it by arguing from first metaphysical principles.  Vining’s 
response to this dimension of the problem is to offer “a phenomenology of law,”56 
pointing out, from every angle of the phenomenon he can discern, the ways in which the 
practice of law itself offers testimony against the mechanistic view of everything, 
                                                 
50
   Jane E. Ruby, The Origins of Scientific “Law”, 47 J. HISTORY IDEAS 341, 348 (1986).  “Evidently at 
some point, regula itself, stripped of prescriptive connotations, took on the meaning of regularity (cf. 
today’s “as a rule”) it has in Grosseteste and Bacon.”  Id. 
51
   VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP, supra note 4, at 21-22. 
52
   Id. at 240.  See also id. at 20-22.  It is not just natural science’s knocking at law’s door that worries 
Vining:  “Into law – the most linguistic of disciplines, person speaking to person, individuals listening and 
speaking on behalf of persons – was imported the view that the discipline of law was a branch of social 
science.  The American Academy of Arts and Sciences makes it such today, and academic lawyers post 
their online papers on the Social Science Research Network.”  Vining, Resilience, supra note 25, at 151, 
154.  “[S]ocial science cannot escape its connection to the natural sciences and the premises or 
commitments of the natural scientist today.”  Id. at 154. 
53
   See Joseph Vining, On the Future of Total Theory: Science, Antiscience, and Human Candor, ERASMUS 
INSTITUTE PAPERS, 1999-01 (Univ. Notre Dame, Erasmus Institute, 1998); Joseph Vining, THE SONG 
SPARROW AND THE CHILD: CLAIMS OF SCIENCE AND HUMANITY 7-8, 9, 14, 40-41, 43, 109 (2004).  In the 
interest of averting a possible misunderstanding, it should be said straight out that Vining is not “opposed” 
to science, only to its overreaching.  Id. at 94. 
54
   See LOUIS DUPRE, THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION OF MODERN CULTURE 
18-44 (2004). 
55
   VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP, supra note 4, at 207. 
56
   Id. at 357. 
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including law and, indeed, ourselves.  The reason law is thus “an object of amazement to 
the modern and post-modern and postmodern mentality,”57 as Vining maintains, is that 
law stands as an opposing witness against all of the claims made all around us on behalf 
(!) of the view that it’s just physics, so to speak, all the way down (and up).  “Law is the 
great overlooked fact in modern thought,” Vining observes:   
 
Its true acknowledgment would threaten radical change, even among those 
whose articulated visions attempt to compete with positivism, on the one 
hand, and positivism’s enemy, historicism, on the other.  With law enters 
personification, in the large and in the small, substance that does not 
ultimately become form or process, responsibility that goes beyond the 
existence of things.  Musical, mathematical, evolutionary visions of the 
ultimate ground of what is, become only partial visions, insufficient. . . .   
 
[I]t is too often overlooked that law is evidence of view and belief far 
stronger than academic statement or introspection can provide.58 
 
Vining’s acute insight, which I think no one has articulated with greater subtlety, is that 
what we do in law is an extended demonstration that rules of science cannot come close 
to accounting for law:  “Law pulls constantly away from science, because it is the 
companion of responsible action in which suffering is brought and responsibility taken 
for it, and suffering is experienced if action is not taken.”59  Again:  “Law connects 
language to person, and person to action, through a form of thought that is not reducible 
to any other.”60  
 Thus the first dimension: Not only is law not explained (or, rather, explained 
away) by the rules of science,  law turns out to be a most impressive demonstration that 
we do not finally, because we cannot, treat persons as mere parts or phases of a causal 
process.  Law is an extended demonstration that all is not process, that persons are 
initiators and not mere products.   
The second dimension is related, and it concerns the ways in which we can, 
nonetheless, aspire to make law as much like science as possible by proliferating “rules” 
in law.  Here there is no question of lack of existential freedom, only of what sorts of 
things we freely create to guide and channel that admitted, and sometimes threatening, 
freedom.  Rules seem to be more reliable guides or channels than standards are, as this 
crisp example makes clear: “it shall be a crime to cry ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre” vs. “it 
shall be a crime to cry ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre if all things considered this was a 
dangerous thing to do.”  The practical preference for apparently more reliable points of 
legal reference was part of what was motivating Justice Scalia in his push for a rule of 
rules, of course, and that concern is by no means unique to him.  There is wide, and  
indeed eminent, agreement that law must be reasonably predictable, else it will fail in one 
of its essential functions.  Law that cannot be adequately pinned down such that you can 
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   Id. at 5. 
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act on the basis of it is a perverse and self-defeating reality.  Whatever else it turns out to 
be, law is a guide to conduct.   
Vining’s further point, however, is that there is some deep illusion or deception at 
work in conceiving of law as – or aspiring to make law – primarily a matrix of rules.  
What is wrong with this conception or aspiration?   
 
Why can’t a “legal rule” become like a “rule” conceived within the terms 
of social science; why indeed is that not an ideal by the law’s own lights, 
something graspable, predictable, ‘objectively’ existing apart from the 
intentions, good faith, assent, and meaning of individuals and persons – 
like a rule of chess?  Much of the answer, I think, is that life is not a game, 
despite what we all sometimes say about life.  
 
Life is not a game and law is not, however much contest is brought into 
law as a device in inquiry and reflection. 61 
     
What does this mean?  Unlike the rules of physics, which are descriptive, the rules 
of a game and “rules” of law alike are, of course, prescriptive.  We can choose to follow 
them, or not.  The consequences of following or not, however, are not of the same kind as 
between the two sorts of prescriptive rules.  Games and law, as no one needs to be 
reminded (except for the fact that so many serious arguments do try to understand law in 
terms of the rules of a game), offer our freedom fundamentally different kinds of results.  
“[G]ames, as games, are empty, and their emptiness is a source of their relief and 
pleasure, the unconflicted joy in the exercise of capacities they allow.  It makes no 
difference what the outcome is, really.”62  “Life,” however, Vining continues, “is not a 
game and law is not”63  Life matters, to the extent that we know it is not exhausted by the 
rules of science.  And law, therefore, matters; it matters to us whose lives these are that 
are not games.     
 Vining concedes that there can be a salutary aspect to talking in law in terms of 
rules, as we noted above.  It is a way of communicating that what one is putting forward 
for serious consideration in a decision-making process is something that is the product of 
careful thought.  Here, then, is how Vining believes “rules” actually function in law:   
 
 
“Rule” – sounding at once of authority, predictability, consistency, 
governance – and all that is put forth in discourse in the language of rules 
and changes of rules and exceptions to rules and violations of rules – will 
be seen by a lawyer to be but a way and only one way of seeking to 
convey what goes on in the legal mind in coming to responsible 
decisions.64 
 
                                                 
61
  Vining, Resilience, supra note 25, at 155-56. 
62
   Id. at 156. 
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   Id. 
64
   VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP, supra note 4, at 239. 
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Rules, then, do not “exist” in law; they are but ways of talking about what is really going 
on in the quest to make law and to say what the law is.     
Vining’s contention is that, for all the talk of rules in law, the attempt at 
assimilation – either to science or to games -- does not succeed, at least most of the time.  
In games, rules achieve what is claimed for them: a binary effect.  In law, however, the 
rules are generated in and appear as parts in a methodical process that is not itself 
governed by any “rule” (or standard) of law that we have made.  Whether made by courts 
or by legislatures, “rules” in law suffer -- or rather enjoy -- the same fate as legislation 
(whether the piece of legislation states a “rule” or a more open-textured standard): 
lawyers and judges work with them, interpret them, take them into account, perhaps 
ignore them – but certainly do not just follow them.  “Rules are not self-executing, in 
law.  There is always, in law, a decision maker, and what are called rules in law are 
expressions of considerations to be taken into account by a decision maker.  They focus 
not on themselves as a self-contained system but upon decision-making activity pointing 
forward.”65   If, in the end, the decision makers do “follow” the rule, this is not because 
the rule worked an inexorable impact on an unwilling mind, the way gravity works on our 
bodies that we would rather see soar.  If this point seems obvious (and as one reads 
Vining it does seem obvious), Vining is not alone in seeing in many legal theories a 
desire for law that can run rail-like through our judgments.66     
To conclude the present point with the aid of our earlier example, the law about 
what are rules under the APA turns out to be, when the analysis (as by Scalia) is over, to 
ignore the rule set out in sec. 551(4) and environs.  Vining saw this coming:  “This is the 
overriding difficulty of statements of law given out in the form of ‘rules,’ always leaving 
out relevant considerations, and why such texts produce such tension when made central 
texts and, after a fashion, decay of their own accord,”67 sometimes with the blessing of 
Justice Scalia, even in the case of a foundational component of a “second-level” 
constitution.            
  
 
V.  Guidance in the Passage to Law 
 
So far forth, then, the picture seems to be this.  First, duly enacted statutes are 
sometimes ignored, and no one cries foul.  Second, “rules” of law are, like legislation, 
(generally) treated as reasons in a decision-making process, not bases for decision and 
action in their own right.  Further, both of these perhaps surprising phenomena are in turn 
said to be justified as (necessary) parts of determining what the law is.  These are so 
many contemporary examples of the fabled phenomenon that practitioners of law 
continue to treat statements of law, such as statutes, as evidence of what the law is, not 
the law itself -- not just when faced solely with judge-made law, but also, as in the APA 
example, when statutes are in play.  (Or perhaps it would be better to say that the 
“common law method” is indispensable to making law, even for one magnetized by a 
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preference for the advertised ontological abstemiousness of the Scalia approach.  I do not 
pursue this possibility here).68     
The question arises, though: Isn’t this ignoring of duly enacted legislation and of 
rules itself the epitome of lawlessness?  Is it not the substitution of caprice for antecedent 
law?  
Vining’s answer, which is framed in terms of legislation but applies mutatis 
mutandis to rules, is fascinating:  “Legislation is that arbitrary which we allow – but also 
limit.  To make the point in its strongest form, it could be said legislation is lawless 
behavior, except that by a paradoxical trick we make legislative statutes materials we use 
in determining what the law is.”69  The lawlessness, on Vining’s account, is in the 
legislation (on account of its being “arbitrary”), not in what we in fact do with the 
legislation.   
But is not what we do with legislation itself arbitrary?  Or, in the alternative, is 
what we do with legislation and rules itself subject to law?  Vining does not, to the best 
of my knowledge, answer yes to this second question.  We are led to ask, then: Is there 
room for a tertium quid between the two horns of this dilemma?  In other words, if the 
process of “determining what the law is” is not law-governed, how can it avoid being just 
as arbitrary as the legislation whose arbitrariness we were worried about in the first 
place? 
 Vining has searching answers to these last questions, and these answers 
constitute, it seems to me, the heart of his alternative account of what we do in law.  I 
find that account almost altogether persuasive.  In the end, though, I am left suspecting 
that there is a piece missing from his tertium quid.  Or perhaps what I perceive as an 
omission is only a terminological elision; Vining’s avoidance of jargon and cliché is 
almost always a help.  If, however, it turns out to be elision rather than omission, I would 
not wish to suppose that something important hadn’t gotten lost sight of in the eliding. 
 A first cut at what Vining regards as governing (if the verb from which the gerund 
is derived is not question-begging in this context) the passage from statute or rule to law 
is persons.  Not divine, angelic, or corporate persons, to be sure, but human persons or, as 
Vining sometimes prefers to call them, individuals.70     
In one sense, of course, hardly anyone today would disagree with this.  We are all 
“legal realists” now, as the cliché has it.  Those of us who live after the jurisprudential 
episode known as Legal Realism, whose promoters acknowledged Holmes as the 
granddaddy of them all, are well acquainted with the fact (which I confess I doubt eluded 
Holmes’s forebears), that law is made, interpreted, and applied by individuals essentially 
like us.  Humans are not mere midwives to laws immaculately conceived elsewhere; we 
have a contribution to make, and are not mere conduits of what Holmes caricatured as 
that “brooding omnipresence in the sky.”  Even Justice Scalia is quietly on board.71 
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At least some of the card-carrying legal realists, however, purported to discover in 
addition that the human contribution to the making, interpreting, and applying of law was 
to be explained --- or, rather, explained away -- causally.  Vining refers to this as the 
“breakfast theory of justice – the theory of the 1930s that what a judge does is determined 
by what breakfast he eats in the morning.”72  This turns out, ironically, to be the back 
door entrance to that tyrannical view of law, which we have already discussed from the 
front door perspective, according to which the rules are only those of science, what 
Vining elsewhere calls a “closed system” from which freedom is absent.  “When at the 
end of one’s search for law one finds oneself deposited in a small white room staring at a 
fried egg, one has the choice of giving up the enterprise, for one really has nothing useful 
or interesting to say and no one to say it to; or one can come out of the room and creep 
back to one’s fellows.”73   
The fellows Vining knows, and believes we all know, in law, as elsewhere, are 
persons.   One can used the italicized word and mean by it what the practitioners of the 
breakfast theory meant.  Vining means something else by it, of course.  That something, 
which is exactly not a thing or an it at all, is difficult to summarize, but we can approach 
it, as Vining does, by identifying what it is not.  The human person is what is not 
explained -- or explained away -- by physicists, biologists, and those other theorists who 
would reduce us to equations.  For such theorists, as Vining says, “love is the 
phenomenon of flesh on flesh, nothing more; a smile is a pulling back of the skin 
covering the teeth; dignity is measure by the relative angles of backbones.”74  But persons 
know better, and more.   
At this level, there is perhaps very little one can say; better maybe is to appeal to 
experience, as John Noonan does:  “By [persons], I mean particular flesh and blood and 
consciousness.  I take as a starting point that we are such beings, and that encountering 
them we recognize those who are in shape and structure, in origin and destiny, like 
ourselves.  I assume that we have the experience of responding to persons.”75  Noonan 
asserts -- he does not argue -- that human persons know human persons, and they are 
irreducible – and, if not ultimate, then certainly penultimate.  Vining is in accord, and is 
here at his most pointed:  “[T]he first and last thing we know, the ultimate object of 
knowledge and belief, is a person, not a principle.  To a person, who is not merely a 
reflection of ourselves, we are not ultimately indifferent. This is what we know, what is 
real, what has meaning.”76  As Steven Smith says in his contribution to this symposium 
on the work of Joseph Vining, for Vining it’s “persons all the way up.”77  (The question 
to which I am coming is whether, for Vining, it is also, as it is for the Thomist, law all the 
way up). 
Persons in law say many things and make many things.  They argue on the floor 
of the legislature, and before that performance is possible they make offices (such as 
president and judge and congressman).  Mostly, though, they make texts.  And when it 
comes time for any one of them to say what the law is, it will not, according to Vining, be 
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solely on the basis of knowledge of a particular text or rule or any thing else.  It is on the 
basis of additional knowledge of a different kind, as Vining explains:  “It is rather 
knowledge of living value, purpose, mind, intent.”78  It is knowledge, in other words, of 
the personal, but not in a completely free-form fashion: 
 
Disciplined pursuit of law-laden questions leads to legal texts but then 
through them and out again, as light is seen narrowing down to go through 
a lens or prism and then expanding beyond.  Legal work on the texts is not 
a means of tracing out what the texts say, but of hearing the law.  The law 
lives – exists – when it is heard, and it is heard through legal work. 
 
And here the connection with religion, the work to make law heard 
proceeds only on presuppositions.  If it does not proceed on those 
presuppositions, it does not produce anything to which there is any sense 
of obligation.  That which evokes no sense of obligation is not law.  It is 
only an appearance of law, the legalistic, the authoritarian, not sovereign 
but an enemy.  Principal among the presuppositions of legal work are that 
a person speaks through the texts; that there is mind; that mind is caring 
mind.  These are the links between the experience of law and religious 
experience.79 
 
Vining’s tertium quid, then, which he sometimes thematizes as “legal method,”80 
seems to be this:  The passage from legal materials to a statement of the law is governed 
by one person’s caring for another person as a person, the caring mind of one person 
using legal materials (and whatever else is necessary) to speak the law to the mind of 
another person.  A person’s being able to speak thus to another bears what Vining calls 
“authority.”  “For law, mind is caring mind.  Mind that does not care is no mind to seek, 
no mind to take into oneself, no mind to obey: it has no authority.”81  In an alternative 
formulation of Vining’s tertium quid, one might say that authority is the bridge for the 
passage from legal materials to a statement of law, and only persons, not things, can bear 
authority, only persons can be authoritative.82    
   In the block quote above and throughout his work, Vining considers the 
possibility that the stating and obeying of law merely presuppose, and do not depend 
upon, the work of persons.  “There is the possibility that the presuppositions which must 
be entertained to do legal work,” the presuppositions, that is, that there are caring minds 
at work and people to be valued and respected, “need only be working presuppositions, 
and one can remain agnostic as to them until the end of one’s life.”83  But is this correct, 
“the possibility” that it makes no difference to the obligatory quality of law whether it is 
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made by persons and for persons?  Vining is dubious: “Belief may be necessary to actual 
and actually experienced obligation and authority, to actual persistence in legal work that 
can lead to actual obligation and authority.”84         
 Vining’s context in what I have just quoted is a subsection of From Newton’s 
Sleep entitled “Law and Religion,” and Vining notes there the contrast between law that 
would operate by presupposition, on the one hand, and religious faith that believes, on the 
other.  “What is the religious faith?”, Vining asks.  “In the West (and in the English 
language) the religious faith is that there is spirit and that life has meaning – or, as is 
sometimes, said, that life is not existence only but is good, is a good.”85   
 
VI.  Lawless Minds? 
 
 Setting aside for the present occasion questions about the place of faith and belief 
in law, but focusing now on the “good,” I would like to return one last time to the 
phenomenon we have been investigating from the beginning, which Vining captures as 
follows:  “The piece of writing that emerges from Parliament is not the law.  It is 
evidence of the law, which is used in the course of arriving at a statement of law.”86  If 
this is so, what then can we say about what goes on “in the course of arriving” at such a 
statement of law?  It could, conceivably, be arbitrary.  It could, at least in theory, be law-
governed.  Or, as Vining would have it, it is neither arbitrary nor law- or rule-governed; 
saying what the law is, is persons using legal materials, which are always linguistic, to 
treat persons as persons on the edge of lives that have never been led before:  “Law 
connects language to person, and person to action.”87  To say what the law is, is to make 
a decision:   
 
Decision making consists of weighing purposes, values, factors, channels 
of thought.  Rules are not self-executing, in law.  There is always, in law, a 
decision maker, and what are called rules in law are expressions of 
considerations to be taken into account by a decision maker.  They not on 
themselves as a self-contained system but upon decision-making pointing 
forward.  Talk of rights and rules of a static kind, projecting an image of 
law standing off by itself, obscures the focus that legal rules have in fact, 
always a decision that must be made, at the edge of lives that have not 
been lived before, in a world that has not been seen before.88    
   
This is beautifully said, and I believe Vining is right to trace law to persons, and within 
persons to minds bent on decision.89   
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 But is that “decision that must be made” lawless?  Is the deciding mind without 
benefit of its own law?  Or, in the alternative, are human minds, freely bent on decision, 
themselves ruled and measured by a higher law?  There is no gainsaying that most 
modern thinking answers no to the third question.  Indeed, this denial is nothing short of 
definitive of the epoch in which we live.  As Remi Brague has recently observed, the 
project of modernity has been to reduce “[t]he idea of law to a purely human 
phenomenon.”90  This is the background against which Vining, not to mention the rest of 
us, think about law.   
Which is not to say, of course, that modernity amounts to a rowdy tapestry of 
moral relativism, nihilism, and prescriptivism; more or less rigorous moral theories of 
many kinds, such as Kant’s and Bentham’s, have had their say and sway, and with 
implications for human lawmaking.  None of these, however, proffers an account of 
higher – that is, divine – legal governance of human persons.  The denial of such 
governance follows necessarily for atheists and agnostics, of course, on pain of 
incoherence.  Fair enough, I suppose, assuming the good faith of the agnostic or atheist.  
Among the remaining theists, the single most important alteration in view in the modern 
period has been the new belief that God does not legislate for the rational creatures he has 
created.  In the memorable words of Russell Hittinger: “divine providence is stripped of 
the predicates of law, [and] we are left with . . .  , at best, . . .  a creating but not a 
commanding God.”91  Or if God does command, He does so only in Scripture, not in his 
very creatures.   
When one stops to think about it, though, the newly minted prospect that God 
created our free minds in a lawless condition is quite startling.  The world to which the 
Deist would consign us looks like this.  On the one hand, irrational, unfree creatures – 
such as puppies and petunias -- would be infallibly moved by God through their created 
inclinations to their respective ends.   Rational human creatures, on the other hand, would 
suffer their inclinations to their end(s), all right, but would enjoy no authoritative measure 
for freely achieving them.  What this would mean, in other words, is that the creator 
created with the certainty that his rational creatures would not, absent divine intervention 
(as in Scripture), be commanded to the end(s) for which God created them.  Created by 
God but not commanded by God, to vary Hittinger’s phrase.  Or, to vary the phrase yet 
again, no measures, or rules, or law imposed by another by which to choose and act.  
Kant celebrated the putative result as “autonomy.”  But is this true?     
St. Thomas Aquinas faced this very question, of possible human lawlessness, 
already in the thirteenth-century, and reached a different answer.  It would, of course, be 
uninteresting and otherwise unprofitable carefully to compare the jurisprudential 
commitments of St. Thomas and, say, Holmes; they come from totally different worlds, 
as Holmes intended.  But Vining’s jurisprudential investments, as Steven Smith and I 
(among others) have observed before, are intriguingly Thomistic in much of their 
substance, though certainly not in their terminology.  Smith has suspected Vining, as 
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have I, of being a crypto-neoclassicist in the jurisprudential tradition that runs from 
Aquinas through Fortescue, Coke, Hooker, and (to some extent) Blackstone.92  For all of 
these jurisprudents and others like them, the dispositive legal fact is that the human mind 
is governed by a real divine law.  Here, then, in terms, is Aquinas’s direct answer to our 
question:   
 
[I]t was necessary for law to be divinely given to man.  Just as the acts of 
irrational creature are directed by God through a rational plan which 
pertains to their species, so are the acts of men directed by God inasmuch 
as they pertain to the individual . . . .  But the acts of irrational creatures, 
as pertaining to the species, are directed by God through natural 
inclination, which goes along with the nature of the species.  Therefore, 
over and above this, something must be given to men whereby they may 
directed in their own personal actions.   
 
* * * * * 
 
[S]ince law is nothing but a rational plan of operation, and since the 
rational plan of any kind of work is derived from the end, anyone capable 
of receiving the law receives it from him who shows the way to the end.  
Thus does the lower artisan depend on the architect, and the soldier on the 
leader of the army.  But the rational creature attains his ultimate end in 
God, and from God . . . .  Therefore, it is appropriate for law to be given 
men by God.93 
 
The traditional name for this higher law is the natural law.  We know it naturally, but its 
pedigree is divine.  It is the higher law that governs free human minds as they go about 
choosing what to do and what not to do.     
Libraries have been written about Aquinas on law and on the natural law 
specifically, but, for present purposes, the single most important affirmation Aquinas 
makes about law, in two parts, is that, first, the original instance of law, which in turn 
provides the definition to which all other putative instances can be compared, is the 
divine mind commanding creatures to the common good, and this is called the eternal 
law.  Second, the natural law is not different from the eternal law, but is itself a 
“participation” or sharing in the eternal law.94  The eternal law and its participation, the 
natural law, are the rules or measures of reason, promulgated by the one who has care of 
the community, for the common good of that community, and this, then, is the definition 
of law.95  Law just is an ordinance of reason that comes from the ruler who has 
responsibility for the whole community, and comes from the ruler in order to move the 
community to the good that is common to the community.  In sum, law is a rule or 
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measure, first in the mind of the law giver, and then in the minds of the members of the 
community, for achieving that good.     
Such terms as measures and rules, while generally foreign to our modern way of 
speaking and thinking about law and about the deciding human mind, are the ones St. 
Thomas Aquinas, and the tradition descending from him, employ, and they are 
complementary ways of describing the same thing:   
 
As stated above (Q. 90. A. 1 ad 1) law, being a rule and measure, can be in 
a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in 
another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes 
of the rule or measure.  Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine 
providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, . . . it is evident that 
all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from 
its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to 
their proper acts and ends.  Now among all others, the rational creature is 
subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it 
partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and 
for others.  Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has 
a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the 
eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.  Hence the 
Psalmist after saying (Ps. Vi.6): Offer up the sacrifice of justice, as though 
someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: Many say, Who 
showeth us good things?  in answer to which question he says: The light of 
thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us:  thus implying that the light 
of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, 
which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on 
us of the Divine light.  It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing 
else than the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law.96 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles 
impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things 
relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and 
measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.97 
 
These dense passages, which are some of the principal canonical texts in the 
tradition of theorizing about the natural law and which give new meaning to Vining’s 
phrase “the legal mind,”98 cry out for an extensive analysis and explanation.  Sufficient to 
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my present purpose, of ferreting out the Thomistic elements in Vining’s jurisprudence, is 
to note, without elaborating, several provocative points of contrast or agreement.       
First, for St. Thomas, and for the entire tradition of which he is the fountainhead, 
law just is a rule and measure, first in the mind of the lawgiver, second in the mind of the 
one to whom it is promulgated and whom it obligates.  The apparent conflict with Vining 
could hardly be more complete.  Whereas Vining denies rules a place in law, Thomas 
defines all law, including the natural law, in terms of its being a rule or measure.   
Second, the conflict may be only apparent, however.  At the level of its most 
primary precepts, the natural law is that “the good is to be done and pursued, and evil 
avoided.”99  The good, which is always concrete, turns out to be the rule that governs all 
of human living and a fortiori human law-making.  Human law-making is no exception 
to the requirements of the natural law.  The ultimate legal rule that governs human law-
making, then, is that the good be done and pursued, and this rule implicates none of the 
shortcomings of “rules” as fingered by Vining.  The rule that is “the good” has all the 
particularity that Vining insists law must have; it leaves nothing out; it is always utterly 
concrete.  Is this good?  If it is not, it is not lawful.  If it is, it is allowed by the natural 
law, and may even be required by the natural law.  (From this last fact nothing follows 
necessarily about whether human law must be made to give it effect.  Prudence, about 
which I have more to say below, will dictate the answer).  If someone should object that 
“the good” is a standard and not a rule, I would reply, for present purposes, that human 
law-making is measured by a measure that is utterly particular:  The good always is 
particular, which is not to say that some things are not always and everywhere against the 
natural law.     
Third, the natural law is the discovered basis on which humans can frame laws for 
themselves.  The process of making human law is always and without exception about 
implementing the requirements of – or, as St. Thomas says, giving determinate or specific 
content to100 -- the natural law, that is, about leading men and women to what is good (for 
them).101  The terminology is different (Vining speaks of value, not goods), but Vining 
would, I think, roughly agree, though with a possible critical qualification to which I 
return below.   
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Fourth, legislation per se, then, far from being a problem in law, is the model of 
law, and here we come full circle.  The eternal law, the natural law, and human law are 
all “law” according to the same definition: an ordinance of reason in the mind of the one 
who has care of the community, for the common good, and promulgated.  If the piece of 
legislation is in fact “arbitrary,” it is not the law; law just is a thing of reason for the 
common good.  And the ruler’s promulgating and people’s receiving such law just is the 
situation in which a community is being ordered to its common good, and this, for the 
Thomist, is what creation is all about, what it is for.   God is such a ruler, through His 
promulgation of the natural law; humans, too, can be such rulers, through their 
promulgation of rules that lead the community to its common good.  The common good is 
not, again for a reason to which I am coming, a concept that animates or organizes 
Vining’s work, though I suspect it of being just around the corner. 
Fifth and finally, unlike the source of the eternal and natural law, the generator 
and promulgator of human law is not omniscient.  When, therefore, the human legislator 
promulgates a statute, it can be defective.  Thomas stresses the need for the legislator to 
be possessed of the proper form of prudence, but even a superabundance of regnative 
prudence cannot assure human laws that will serve the common good in every 
instance.102  When St. Thomas develops, as he does, a fairly elaborate account of how 
laws are to be interpreted (according to the mind of the legislator)103, of when individuals 
can be dispensed from the law (when it would benefit the common good)104, and so forth, 
the contents of the account are predictable.  Why?  As the examples just mentioned 
indicate, for St. Thomas the answers to these jurisprudential questions -- the equity of the 
statute, dispensation when the common good demands or suggests it, etc. – follow from 
the nature of law (and, to be sure, prudential decisions about how to realize it); they are 
not, as is sometimes supposed, accidents of history or legally-unguided choices of 
“policy.”   
This merits emphasis.  The crux of the matter is that law is an ordinance of 
reason, not a piece of paper; the law is only “in” the paper metaphorically.  To know law, 
is to receive something from the mind of the lawgiver.  In this sense, law is indeed “given 
to the subject,” a possibility Vining doubts.105  But notice that coercion is no part of the 
Thomistic definition of law.  Citizen-subjects are to be ruled by freely receiving and 
conforming to the ordinance of reason in the lawgiver’s mind and promulgated.  
Relatedly, they are not to substitute their own “understanding,” as the textualist bids 
them, for the rational and promulgated will of the legislator.  Vining is right that “[t]here 
is always a temptation in law to approach a statute as if its words had meanings in 
themselves and by themselves – the authoritarianism sometimes shown by those devoted 
to maintaining the supremacy of democratic politics and legislative authority.”106  To 
which temptation the reply is this: Strictly speaking, law is only “in” the mind, of the 
lawgiver and then of the person to whom it is given.107  Law is what the lawgiver means 
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and promulgates, and it is legally incumbent on the people to receive and be ruled by 
what was first in the mind of the legislator.  In the words of St. Thomas:  “[A] law is in a 
person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that is ruled.”108  
If we can say that for St. Thomas legislation is a problem in law, it is in the sense 
that it may sometimes or even often be difficult, in this fallen world, for legislators to 
form worthy laws and difficult for people to know them.  The properly interpreted statute 
that in fact leads to the common good is not a problem in law; the statute that fails in that 
task, or fails to communicate the mind of the legislator, is indeed a problem in law.  In 
the world as we know it and can expect it to be, there is no gainsaying the ampleness of 
the opportunity for miscommunication and misunderstanding.  These issues deserve more 
consideration than the present occasion allows.  The fundamental point, though, is that 
from the eternal law right down to the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, law is 
always and exclusively about the ruler’s moving his subjects toward the common good, 
from one mind to other minds.  And this is very good, not a problem, though it is 
inevitably a process fraught with the possibility of error.109            
In sum, from the point of view of the Thomistic natural law tradition, the answer 
to the question we have been pressing, then, is yes.  All human living, and a fortiori all 
human law-making, is law-governed, and without the slightest threat to human free 
choice, though in a way that I have yet to explicate.   On the Thomistic account, although 
there certainly are and should be parts of life that are not ruled by human law, there are 
no lawless pockets in creation.  It’s law all the way up, just as it is – if I may introduce 
the necessary complement en passant -- grace all the way up.110     
 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
 The contrast I have been sketching is between, on the one hand, Vining’s proper 
and largely salutary skepticism and corrective concerning the operative place of rules in 
human law, and, on the other, Thomas’s defining all law in terms of the very concept 
Vining seemingly rejects.  What accounts for this contrast?  Part of the answer is that 
Vining’s worry -- that persons and their minds will be dissolved away into the rules and 
laws of natural and social science -- perhaps leads him prematurely to exclude the 
possibility that, not just in chess but in life, a ruler can deliver to another person a truly 
binding rule of conduct (in the form of a true law) without threatening human free choice.  
Talk of law and rules has, for almost five-hundred years now, veered, like a car out of 
alignment, in the direction of the laws and rules of physics, not those that would measure 
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human freedom,111 and, moving from simile to metaphor, the baby has exited with the 
bath water.  Vining, however, fully alive to the exigence of keeping human freedom in 
the picture, perhaps overlooks or diminishes the possibility that sometimes those in ruling 
authority, whether God or man, do deliver legal rules that both respect human freedom 
and have a valid claim to bind persons (in their freedom).  Is it possible, though, that 
Vining has not merely overlooked or diminished, but sub silentio rejected, this position?   
If we suspect Vining of being overly cautious about the possibility of binding 
rules of law, we might in turn ask why Aquinas is so confident about their possibility.  
We might also ask, indeed, how exactly Thomas thinks humans can be obligated by a 
natural law -- that is, bound by a natural law -- without thereby losing their freedom.112  I 
cannot develop the answer here,113  but it is sufficient to my present purpose to indicate 
that Vining’s exact worry -- that being under a rule of law is inconsistent with human 
freedom -- was anticipated by St. Thomas.  In the words of one modern commentator, St. 
Thomas understood perfectly well that he needed to establish that “natural law exists in 
rational creatures in a different way than in irrational creatures and does not cancel free 
choice.”114  The key to Thomas’s solution is, in a phrase, the hypothetical necessity that 
comes from the rational creature’s being ordered, by virtue of his created nature, to his 
due end, an end he must freely choose (or flout).115  The key to the classical position is 
that the rational creature is created with an end that he truly ought -- “debeat”116 is one of 
the usual Latin terms to express this notion of obligation -- to achieve.  Can Vining abide 
this notion of a created “ought?”   
The Newton who figures in the title of Vining’s perhaps greatest book gave us not 
only modern science, but, with it, a different cosmos.  As Louis Dupre explains,   
 
Mechanism had begun as a scientific theory.  It soon became a controlling 
concept for the interpretation of all reality, including life and, with some, 
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of the mind itself.  Thus it developed into a worldview, an ambitious 
attempt to capture all reality within a comprehensive, undifferentiated 
system ruled by identical laws.  This worldview implied an all-
encompassing determinism that threatened the very possibility of freedom.  
. . .   Romantic opponents of Enlightenment culture rejected the mechanist 
world-view (none more vehemently than Blake).  But many retained its 
subjacent naturalism, including the idea that humanity becomes crushed 
by nature.  Individuals may resist, but in the end nature smothers their 
futile efforts. 117 
 
If we begin, contra Aquinas, from the modern assumption or conviction which is the 
hallmark of that new cosmos, that the human creature has no due end, we will hardly be 
in position to conclude that the creature is free yet bound.118  Crushed by the “breakfast 
theory” writ large, that’s the end of the matter.  Which cosmos is Vining’s?   
As we observed, Vining reached the conclusion that “the religious faith is that 
there is spirit and that life has meaning – or, as is sometimes said, that life is not existence 
only but is good, is a good.”  But St. Thomas, while certainly believing that what God 
created is “very good” (Genesis 1:31), also affirms that the good – our due end – is 
something to which we are bound by a natural law, which is knowable, at least in 
principle, by human reason.  The natural law is, indeed, exactly the law that commands 
us to achieve our due end, what is good for us.  The good not only is, as a transcendental 
property of being, but what ought be to be done, “for the essence of good consists in this, 
that something perfects another as an end.”119  Being free yet bound depends on our 
having an end, a good, that we ought to achieve.  “Value” doesn’t quite rise to the 
occasion.120       
Which is why, in the end, Justice Scalia just may be right that “Vining (with 
appropriate disclaimer) is about as far as one can go without offending [academic] 
proprieties.”121   That is already a long, long way.  It might be too much today to proceed, 
as the Liber Augustalis did, from the premise that “[a]fter Divine Providence had formed 
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the universe, . . . [God] put [His rational creatures] under a certain law . . . ,”122 a law 
ordering the multitude to its common good.  Alternatively, might that premise be exactly 
what our day and time need above all to acknowledge and recover, an “object of 
amazement to the modern mind,” an occasion, indeed, for a sip of Chartreuse?     
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